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Studying and Teaching History in the
Aftermath of 1968: A Memoir
Hans-Jürgen Grabbe
1 Politics has been a concern of mine since I was about fourteen years old, and since my
American Field Service exchange in 1965–1966 I  have been following world events as
closely as possible. However, in the fall of 1967 I became a soldier in the West German
Army and was cut off from much of the information that I had so eagerly digested before.
Of course, I knew that the government of the Grand Coalition was in power in Bonn and
that my hero Willy Brandt had become foreign minister. I had high hopes for East-West
reconciliation. Vietnam had been on my mind since 1965, but in 1967 it was not at the
forefront of my interests. The unrest in Poland in March 1968 also largely escaped my
attention, as did the events of May 1968 in France.
2 But when Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20–21, my
battalion  was  moved  to  a  marshalling  area  in  the  forests  of  northern  Hesse.  As  I
understand today,  we were part  of  a  NATO force protecting the so-called Fulda Gap
through which an anticipated Soviet and East German move into southern Germany had
to come. I knew nothing about that at the time, and after weeks in the sticks my only
concern was a hot bath, which I eventually enjoyed at a nearby hospital.
3 My second encounter with the forces unleashed in 1968 came in October. I  had been
promoted to the rank of ensign and was an officer of the guard at Field Marshall Rommel
Barracks in Augustdorf near the Westphalian city of Bielefeld. One day, I was told by my
superiors  to  draw  up  emergency  plans  in  case  rebellious  students  from  Bielefeld
University attempted to force an entry into the Augustdorf compound. 
4 Bielefeld at that time was still a university in statu nascendi. Niklas Luhmann, a sociologist,
became the first professorial appointee on October 1, 1968, and the university received its
charter roughly a year later. But there was student unrest everywhere in West Germany
and West Berlin, and some of the repercussions had reached this Westphalian backwater.
5 In March 1969 I  was discharged as second lieutenant and decided that I  would begin
studying history, political science, and English at the University of Hamburg the following
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summer. My ambition was to become a secondary school teacher and for that two or
three fields  of  study were necessary.  Since Hamburg at  that  time had many famous
scholars on its faculty, I also wanted to pursue a broad studium generale.
6 This brought me into the Auditorium Maximum, with a seating capacity of 1700, where
Reinhard Tausch, chair of educational philosophy, held an introductory lecture. About
halfway  through,  and  much  to  my  bewilderment,  he  encouraged  us  to  turn  to  our
neighbors  right  and  left  and  begin  two  minutes  of  what  he  called  “gegenseitige
Wertschätzung” (mutual appreciation). The idea was that we should smile at one another
and engage in small talk. Later I learned that this was an exercise in group dynamics, but
since I did not know that at the time, I quietly left.
7 To form groups, to study in groups, to present findings as a group was the order of the
day. I did not care for this because I had spent the last two years of my life in a group and
wanted to be left alone. I did not even apply for a room in a dormitory. It seemed that
everybody in education, psychology, and the social sciences and most junior faculty in all
other fields were influenced by Bruce Tuckman’s concept of group dynamics and its five
steps of forming, storming, norming, performing, and informing.1 
8 My first seminar in political science, in the summer semester of 1970, was an introduction
to comparative politics. Students were to compare the German, British, and American
systems of government. However, we only spent about half of the thirteen sessions on
questions relevant to the topic. In the first session a young woman rose and suggested a
study  program  focusing  on  group  dynamics.  She  also  said,  however,  that  we  were
probably not ready yet for that ambitious project and so should begin to enquire about
ourselves by reading Anna Freud. Since this proposal was voted down, it took me some
time to realize that she was referring to Freud’s Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents
which had been put  out  in  a  pirated edition by  a  publisher  called “Rotverlag”  (Red
Publishing House) in 1970. 2 
9 The four  lectures  that  comprise  Anna Freud’s  book were originally  presented to  the
teachers of the Children’s Center in Vienna. They were on “Infantile Amnesia and the
Oedipus Complex,” “The Infantile Instinct-Life,” “The Latency Period,” and “The Relation
between Psychoanalysis  and Pedagogy.” In the latter,  Anna Freud recommended that
teachers  undergo  psychoanalysis  before  educating  children,  and  perhaps  my  fellow
student  of  political  science  wished  to  recommend  that  we  analyze  ourselves  before
embarking on further study. Individual and collective analyses were on everyone’s lips in
those days. In 1967, psychologists Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich had published
their seminal work Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens (The Inability
to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior) which was on the bestseller lists for more than a
year and sold over a hundred thousand copies in cloth.3 The Mitscherlichs claimed that in
the  Adenauer  era,  from  1949  to  1963,  West  Germans  had  collectively  suppressed
memories of their Nazi past and had failed to acknowledge the crimes committed in the
name of National Socialism. This was also one of the major reproaches brought against
the so-called establishment during the early stages of the student movement.
10 But let us move back to my political science seminar. I was part of a group that was to
look  into  the  British  parliamentary  system.  Since  there  was  no  guidance  from  the
lecturer, we counted on the senior member of the group to lead the way. He told me to go
to the library and to check out a little red book from an East German publisher. This was
by a “Collective of Authors under the Direction of Günther Großer“ and bore the title: Der
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wissenschaftliche  Kommunismus―Bestandteil  des  Marxismus-Leninismus:  Einführung  in  den
Gegenstand und die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Kommunismus (“Scientific Communism
―A Component of Marxism-Leninism: Introduction to the Subject and to the History of
Scientific Communism”).4 I  was bewildered, since I had never thought of socialism as
scientific in any way. As a consequence, the performing and informing parts of our group
work were a total disaster. I did not accept what I had read, which in short could be
subsumed in a motto from a banner shown in East Berlin in the late 1960s (and now in the
possession of the German Historical Museum): “Marxism-Leninismn is correct, because it
is true.”5 As a consequence, I kept quiet. The lecturer then turned the plenary session
into a tribunal and asked our fellow students whether we deserved the coveted “Schein”
or certificate of achievement. It was at that moment that I quit studying political science. 
11 The situation in the history department was different, but the insistence on group work
was similar.  Horst-Eberhard Richter,  a  psychiatrist  and a leading figure in the peace
movement,  had written a book entitled Die Gruppe―Hoffnung auf  einen neuen Weg,  sich
selbst  und  andere  zu  befreien:  Psychoanalyse  in  Kooperation  mit  Gruppeninitiativen  (“The
Group―Hope  for  a  New  Way  to  Liberate  Oneself  and  Others:  Psychoanalysis  in
Cooperation with Group Initiatives”). It was a best-selling book in 1972.6 Richter used to
park his  Jaguar XJ  in a side street  near the Auditorium Maximum when he came to
lecture. For him, the traditional nuclear family was a “defenseless and willing tool of
overpowering  societal  influences.”  In  contrast,  the  group  might  cure  or  help  avoid
inhibitions that prevented us from embarking on an emancipatory course.7 
12 Emancipation was the key word of 1968 and beyond. As a fledgling history student I was
first acquainted with it, as were many others, through the writings of Jürgen Habermas.
One work in particular had a major impact on German intellectual discourse in 1968 and
the years that followed. This was “Erkenntnis und Interesse”, his 1965 inaugural lecture
at the University of Frankfurt upon Main, published in 1968 as part of a collection with
the same title. It appeared in America as Knowledge and Human Interests in 1971.8
In the United States and in Britain the impact was less pronounced. Knowledge and Human
Interest finishes forty-ninth among the fifty twentieth-century works most cited in the
Arts  &  Humanities  Citation  Index  between  1976  and  1983.9 The  front  runners  were
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,  James Joyce, Ulysses,  and Northrop
Frye,  Anatomy  of  Criticism.  Wittgenstein,  Chomsky,  Foucault,  Derrida,  Roland Barthes,
Heidegger  and  Ernst  Robert  Curtius  occupied  slots  four  to  ten.  In  “Erkenntnis  und
Interesse”, Habermas develops a theory of “knowledge-constitutive interests” that are
tied both to “the natural history of the human species” and to “the imperatives of the
socio-cultural form of life,” but are not reducible to them. There are three knowledge-
constitutive interests. The first is the “technical interest,” the “anthropologically deep-
seated  interest”  we  have  in  the  prediction  and  control  of  the  natural  environment.
Second, there is the equally deep-seated “practical interest” in securing and expanding
possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life. Finally, there is the
“emancipatory interest” in overcoming dogmatism, compulsion, and domination.10
13 It  was only recently that  I  read James F.  Bohman’s  appraisal  that  “the status of  the
emancipatory  interest  [.  .  .]  was  problematic  from  the  start.”  Bohman  is  Danforth
Professor of  Political  Philosophy,  Philosophy of  Social  Science,  and 19th Century and
Contemporary German Philosophy at St. Louis University, and he writes in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philsosophy: “The interest in emancipation does not clearly correspond to a
specific science or form of institutionalized inquiry. Although Freudian psychology and
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Marxist  social  theory  have  such  an  interest,  much  if  not  most  psychological  and
sociological inquiry does not have explicitly emancipatory aims, but rather is driven by
interests in prediction and social understanding. Nor was it clear that psychoanalysis
provided an apt model of liberatory reflection , [since,] as critics pointed out, [. . .] the
asymmetries between patient and analyst could not represent the proper intersubjective
form for emancipation. These deficits posed a challenge for Habermas that would guide a
decades-long  search  for  the  normative  and  empirical  basis  of  critique.”11 Habermas
eventually overcame this challenge, but I, my fellow students, my teachers and just about
everybody  whom  I  knew  at  the  time  did  not.  In  his  book  Legitimationsprobleme  im
Spätkapitalismus, translated in 1975 as Legitimation Crisis,12 Habermas argued not only that
the demands of advanced capitalism restrict the scope and significance of democracy, but
also  that  the  state  is  “crisis-ridden”  and  unable  to  solve  structural  problems  of
unemployment, economic growth, and environmental destruction. Contrary to “formal”
democracy understood as majority rule,  Habermas proposes “substantive democracy,”
which emphasizes the “genuine participation of citizens in political will formation.”13
What Habermas had in mind may well have been the civic culture as described by Almond
and  Verba  in  1963.14 But  it  translated  differently  into  the  history  taught  at  my
department in Hamburg. 
14 The scion of Hamburg historians was Fritz Fischer who, in 1967, had published a massive
tome on Der Griff  nach der Weltmacht (literally: “Seizing World Power”),  to be followed
eight years later by his Krieg der Illusionen (War of Illusions).15 Fischer was aloof from the
intellectual trends of the times but commanded great respect among students because he
had dared to challenge the conventional wisdom that the great powers of Europe had
somehow become mixed up in a crisis that brought about the First World War. Instead,
Fischer insisted that German imperialists craving the proverbial place in the sun and
overall dominance were to blame. The “Fischer thesis” was perceived as an emancipatory
act because it put most of the older generation of historians on the defensive and opened
the door for the kind of purgatory experience that the Mitscherlichs demanded, drawing
a line from Luther to Bismarck and Hitler, thus discrediting once and for all the German
nation state. 
15 In 1974, one of Fischer’s students, Immanuel Geiss, and Rainer Tamchina, my immediate
predecessor as assistant professor of overseas history at the history department of the
University of Hamburg, published a two-volume collection of essays entitled “Views of
the Future Study of History” (Ansichten einer künftigen Geschichtswissenschaft).  The first
volume dealt with criticism, theory, and methodology, the second offered an example of
the new historiography that the authors proposed. Taking stock of the historiography of
the  late  1960s,  Geiss  diagnosed  restoration,  stagnation,  and  productive  crisis.  He
contrasted a historiographic orthodoxy of “heralds and apologists” of the Wilhelmine
empire and Hitler’s Third Reich with a new generation of historians who matured in the
student  movement  of  the  late  1960s  and  who  increasingly  turned  away  from  the
“conservative  CDU/CSU.”  This  generation, he  insisted,  had been willing  to  learn the
historic  lessons  of  1917  and  1945,  of  the  “unmistakable  crisis  of  capitalism,”  of  the
dissolution  of colonial  imperialism  and―somewhat  tautologically―of  “the  definitive
perdition” of the Third Reich and fascism.16 Students and the general public were tired of
history  and had even lost  history  because  of  the  sterility  of  an  older  generation  of
practitioners whose dated historicism dealt only with the ups and downs of the German
nation state.17
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16 The tasks at hand were to cease production of narratives that legitimized rule and to
unmask myths and legends. The historiography of the future should use the “historic
dimension” for a better understanding of the present and as a contribution towards a
rational  and humane design for  the  future.  Scientific  work  was  legitimate  only  if  it
contributed to the political enlightenment of society.18 In the proseminar “Introduction
to the Study of Modern History” which I attended in the summer semester of 1969, we
were advised to always look for “handfeste Interessen”―the tangible, material interest
that allegedly stood behind every historical phenomenon. 
17 The years after 1968 were the halcyon days of the concept of Geschichte als Historische
Sozialwissenschaft (History  as  Historical  Social  Science),  popularized  by  Hans-Ulrich
Wehler  in  a  slim  Suhrkamp  pocket  book  of  1973.19 Sociology,  economics,  and
psychoanalysis were the new ingredients that, according to Wehler, should strengthen
the  social  scientific  credentials  of  history.  The  faculty members  from  the  Hamburg
history  department  in  their  Views  of  the  Future  Study  of  History  proposed
“Gesellschaftsgeschichte”, history of society, as the new paradigm, with Max Weber as
one of the patron saints. But they also insisted that history become a “critical” discipline,
embracing the critical theory of Habermas and the Frankfurt School.20 
18 Where would all this lead in practice? Volume two of Views of the Future Study of History
provides  an  answer.  It  is  entitled  “Revolution:  A  Historical  Longitudinal  Section.”
Following  a  brief  introduction  on  “Revolution  in  World  History,”  individual  authors
explore the transition from the Roman republic to the principate under the subtitle “A
Revolution?,” ask whether the Ciompi Revolt (a 1378 uprising in Florence) constituted a
conflict between estates or was indeed a revolution; other authors deal with the French
Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the abortive German revolution of 1918–1919, and
industrialization and revolution (with Japan and China as case studies). The penultimate
chapters are devoted to national liberation and social change in Latin America and Africa.
Taken on its  own,  it  is  a  stimulating book.  However,  in the mid-1970s the Hamburg
history department modified its curriculum to make room for so-called project studies.
The first project introduced was, not surprisingly, Revolution, a series of courses that
built on one another and that, if one enrolled in them, would have constituted about fifty
percent of the total required workload in the master’s program.
19 What was my answer as a student of history when faced with these developments? It was
to turn to the study of the United States. Whereas an average of well over one hundred
students flocked to the courses of the new historians, most of whom parochially focused
on  themes  of  German  history,  only  five  co-students  attended  my  first  U.S.  History
seminar on “The Pacific as a Sphere of Interest of European and American Powers.” We
looked at charts of the Juan da Fuca Strait (separating Vancouver Island and the north
coast of  Washington state),  read US-American,  British,  and Spanish source texts,  and
marveled at the exploits of His Majesty’s Company of Merchant Adventurers Trading into
Hudson’s Bay. And an adventure it was. I have never tired of it since. 
20 In the winter semester of 1970, the traditional intermediary examination was abolished
and courses were no longer graded. One passed, or one failed; grading was considered
oppressive. I must admit, I rather liked this aspect of the new system. However, in 1977,
when I taught my first seminar as an Assistant Professor, I found it infiltrated by about a
dozen members of the Marxist-Reichist Initiative. Wilhelm Reich was a psychotherapist
who  believed  in  primordial  cosmic  energy  and  built  a  machine  called  an  Orgon
Accumulator that would boost man’s orgiastic potency.  The Marxist-Reichists did not
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insist  on  having  an  orgy  in  class,  but  they  did  insist  that  I  had  no  authority  over
proceedings, that the students were completely autonomous, and that I might only advise
them  when  specifically  asked  to  do  so.  The  course  was  on  the  Federal  Republic  of
Germany in the 1950s, at a time when the notorious Hans Globke was State Secretary in
the Chancellor’s Office. In their presentation, the Marxist-Reichists insisted on calling
him Hans Maria von Globke. I must admit, I was utterly helpless and only rose to their
challenge when the group taunted and ostracized the daughter of the then mayor of
Hamburg, a Social Democrat, who, in their perverted view, was a betrayer of the working
class and a crypto-fascist.
21 What had gone wrong? Between 1968 and 1971, ideas of emancipation had slowly but
steadily given way to a strict class consciousness among a vociferous, well-organized and
well-funded minority of students. For them, the emancipatory interest was identical with
the interest  of  a mythical  working class. In 1969,  the Marxist  kernel  of  the SDS,  the
Socialist German Student Federation, left this organization and founded an Association of
Marxist Students, renamed the Marxist Student Federation Spartacus (MSB Spartacus) in
1971.  The MSB Spartacus soon became the strongest faction in the Hamburg student
parliament.  It  was  affiliated  with  the  German  Communist  Party  and  funded  by  the
Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic.  Equally orthodox, but more
sectarian―one might  say  almost  Scientology-like―was  the  Communist  Federation of
West Germany (Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschland) whose members had to deliver
up ten percent of their earnings, gifts, and inheritances. Prominent figures like Horst-
Eberhard Richter no longer spoke to students in Hamburg. Instead, the “student Bernd
Rabehl,” as he was advertised (then in his twenty-third semester), a friend and comrade-
in-arms of Rudi Dutschke, lectured about the problems of class struggle. Today, Rabehl
lectures at rallies of the neo-Nazi party NPD.
22 Less orthodox students like myself briefly flirted with the Maoists who were perceived as
less orthodox and more intelligent. I still possess a copy of the Words of Chairman Mao,
purchased in 1969. For a time, I subscribed to the Peking Review, but this was curiosity
mixed with a desire to appear different. I also sported a mustache and smoked a pipe.
Another  group,  the  Maoist  Communist  Party  of  Germany/Marxist-Leninist,  whose
seemingly limitless funds (rumoured to come from North Korea) provided a stream of
quality  posters  and  pamphlets,  unmasked  me  as  an  enemy  of  the  people  on  a  wall
newspaper in the lobby of the so-called Philosophy Tower that housed the humanities. At
least I was spared the experience of a mock execution. There were incidents in the 1970s
when students would violently enter an office, put a plastic sack over the occupant’s
head,  open  the  window  and  push  him  or  her  on  to  the  window  sill.  The  history
department,  I  might add,  is  on the ninth floor of  a thirteen-story building.  One day,
students got hold of a master key, opened all the doors and lifted them from the hinges.
Hapless  professors  stood  on  the  thresholds  of  their  offices,  arms  askance,  trying  to
protect their files.  In vain,  of course.  This ended the community of Hamburg history
teachers and students for about two decades. After that, emancipation, as far as I was
concerned, was a dead letter, and I decided to become my own man.
23 I have always had a soft spot for Leopold von Ranke’s often misunderstood guideline to
the historian found in the preface to his first book, the Histories of the Latin and Teutonic
Peoples. Ranke wrote that his work did not aspire to the “high offices” that had previously
(in the Enlightenment) been assigned to history: Historiography does not have “the duty
to judge the past, nor to instruct contemporaries with an eye to the future, but rather
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merely to show how it actually was.”21 Another sentence from the same source looms
large: The intent of the historian is dependent on his opinion or mindset.22 This is not a
paraphrase of Habermas’ “erkenntnisleitendendes Interesse” because the emancipatory
urge is  lacking.  I  see it  more as  an admonition to be cautious and aware that  one’s
intellectual, cultural, and ethnic roots have a bearing on one’s research and subsequent
ratiocinations.
24 As a historian of the United States, I have tended to shy away from what Max Weber
called “Werturteile” (value judgments)―difficult as this may have been in the era of
George W. Bush―and have tried my best to explain American history and society to
students  and  the  general  public  in  my  own  country  without  taking  sides  in  intra-
American  conflicts.  In  a  way,  I  have  become  a  disciple  of  Hans-Georg  Gadamer’s
philosophical hermeneutics by insisting “on the limited role of method and the priority of
understanding as a dialogic, practical, situated activity.”23 Looking back on over thirty
years  as  a  professional  historian,  I  can say  that  this  is  the  lesson that  1968  and its
aftermath taught me.
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